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FAIR AND EFFECTIVE USE OF PRESENT
ANTITRUST PROCEDURE*
By THURMAN ARNOLDt
No GOVERNMENT policy has received such long and unquestioned public
acceptance as that expressed by the Sherman Antitrust Act. The dom-
ination of market by small groups and the concentration of wealth and
power in a few have been a matter of continuing public concern for over
40 years. However, in spite of a governmental religion officially dedicated
to the economic independence of individuals, the growth of great organ-
izations in America has been amazing. The Internal Revenue statistics
for 1935 show that over 50% of all net corporate income is earned by
less than one-tenth of 1% of the corporations reporting, and 84% of
the aggregate corporate net profits is earned by less than 4% of the cor-
porations reporting. We have become a nation of employees. Our private
property, our security in our old age and the care of our families when
we die usually consist of claims held directly or indirectly against great
industrial organizations.
Our problem is therefore to define the public responsibility of such
organizations, and to determine where industrial efficiency ends and in-
dustrial empire building begins. As a practical matter, indicated in the
President's statement of February 18th, the question of prices over-
shadows the entire subject. We are accustomed to think of prices for
building material, for aluminum kitchen utensils and for the various other
things which are essential to decent living, as different.from taxes. But
when these prices are set by a group which dominates the market, the only
difference between such prices and taxes is the fact that such prices are
levied without public responsibility or public control, and that their
proceeds are used for private and not for public purposes. Mr. Justice
Brandeis recognized this as early as 1922 when in The New England
Divisions Case' he called a railroad rate a tax. The failure of the public
to realize that monopoly prices are taxes has been possible only because
our peculiar mythology makes this sort of taxation by industrial organi-
zations a more pleasant way of levying tribute than direct taxation by
government, even though tribute when paid in the form of price runs
only to the benefit of the few while when levied in the form of taxes it
runs to the benefit of all. Yet the effect in reducing our individual incomes
is even worse because such industrial prices so officially L~xed are taxes
levied on the rich and poor alike. And they are worse for another reason
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because monopoly prices not only tax incomes but tend to destroy the
sources of the incomes themselves.
The great mass of our population sell their goods, and services, and
labor in the competitive markets. They buy their necessities in a con-
trolled market. This is certainly at least one of the reasons why the
income tax figures for 1935 show only 2,110,890 taxable incomes of over
$2500 for married persons and $1000 for single persons in a nation of
130,000,000. It is also at least one reason why, with the beginning of
the depression of 1929, the Brookings Institution showed that 21% of
all American families had family incomes of less than $1000 per year.
To illustrate more concretely, we have charged the Aluminum Company
of America with substantially complete monopoly control of the domestic
source of raw material, coupled with practices which consolidate that
monopoly. The result, in terms of prices, is this: Using 1926 as a base,
aluminum prices receded from a high of 100 in that year to 84.9 in 1931-
1933, a decline in the depth of the depression of only 15%. Meanwhile,
to cite another metal, copper prices had dropped from 100 in 1926 to
40.3 in 1932, a decline of 60%, four times the decline in the aluminum
prices. And the entire combined wholesale index dropped 35% during
the same period, more than twice the decline in aluminum prices. Again,
in September 1937, two government invitations for bids on Ford size
6.60 x 16 4-ply tires resulted in an identical price of $8.11 from all
bidders. Investigation was instituted by the Department of Justice. When
new bids were taken by the government a remarkable change had taken
place. Instead of being identical the bids were competitive. Instead of
$8.11 the low was now $4.75. In the meantime the public prices had not
substantially varied.
All this by way of introduction, and I will not pursue these observa-
tions further because they have been made before. In general, however,
I think we can agree that an efficient industrial organization is one capable
of producing goods in quantities sufficient and at prices low enough to
insure them a permanent place in an American standard of living. This
means that whenever competition is destroyed there is no alternative except
to interfere with and regulate arbitrary power to maintain rigid prices.
In other words, monopoly means, sooner or later, government interference
in business. I am willing to face that problem when the need arises. Yet
it is precisely because I do not wish those areas of necessary interference
to increase and because I want to keep the government out of business
that I am an advocate of the consistent enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws.
Today the monopoly problem has become so acute that the President
has suggested the need for strengthening the Aiititrust Laws and for
new legislation relating to an antitrust policy. I, am not, however, going
to talk this evening on the Antitrust Laws as they should be. That
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problem is before Congress. I am going to speak on the Antitrust Laws
as they are, which is the only present problem before the Department of
Justice. In my recent book, "The Folklore of Capitalism," I have sug-
gested that while past enforcement of the Antitrust Laws has saved us
from recognizing the cartel system, it has not hampered the growth of
organizations which dominate our industrial structure. One reason has
been that we have treated the Antitrust Laws as a moral problem and have
been more interested in pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp corporate intent than
in determining violations of our anti-monopoly policy in terms of practical
results. This is a matter of history. The assessment of the blame for
what has happened in the past, while an interesting theological enterprise,
gives no solution whatever. The duty before the Department of Justice
is not to preach against the misdeeds of those who have gone before us,
but to devise methods of utilizing the antitrust procedure which is at its
disposal efficiently and fairly. That, therefore, is the subject of my ad-
dress.
In discussing this problem I am going to be as definite and as explicit
as I can. However, I know that you all realize that antitrust policy
touches fields and boundaries which recede as you approach them and
disappear each time you try to stake then out. Definiteness and precision
in this area have been impossible even for the courts. It is even more
impossible for the prosecuting arm of the government which is trying to
follow a consistent policy of treating the mass of violations, not all of
which can be prosecuted or even investigated. Yet none of the pressing
problems of government can be solved by rule of thumb. This should
not prevent us from being as definite and explicit as the nature of the
question permits. Where the exercise of judgment and discretion is neces-
sary, we can at least make public the grounds and the policy behind our
use of that discretion. I will therefore discuss generally the considerations
which underlie prosecution by the Department.
The first question of policy which I think should be publicly answered
is why we ought not to exercise our judgment and discretion in slowing
up antitrust prosecution during the present period of depression in order
to give business the confidence to expand. The legalistic answer to that
question is easy. It is found in our national belief in the efficacy of law
enforcement as an end in itself.
A better answer is found in the examination of economic reality. It
is mnr conviction that from a long range point of view the vigorous en-
forcement of Antitrust Laws is never more important than during periods
of economic recession. Such periods give the larger and stronger firms
new incentives and easier opportunities for extending their control over
a narrow market. It is during these periods that the smaller firms, weak-
ened by declining sales apd profits, are most susceptible to destruction as
the result of practices denounced by the Antitrust Laws. In other words,
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times of financial failure are the very times when persons with a thirst
for power pick up the broken pieces of competing organizations and put
them together. The clock can not be turned back when prosperity returns
again. It is extremely difficult to recreate competitive organizations which
have been destroyed because effective organizations are the result of habits
and discipline and team work. Even the best baseball team after being
disbanded for a year can not suddenly come together and win games.
Organizations take time to build. They do not become efficient overnight.
When they collapse it is anybody's guess whether they can be built up
again. Therefore, the further an industry proceeds along the road to
monopoly the more difficult is the application of the Antitrust Laws, for
the reason that the Antitrust Laws in themselves can not rebuild the com-
petitive organizations which have been destroyed.
We recognize that competition may be destroyed not only by active
suppression; it may also be destroyed by the over-competition resulting
from a temporary over-supply and a catastrophic price decline. Orderly
markets are necessary in order to maintain the solvency of competitors.
We must recognize that we are living in a world of competing organiza-
tions rather than competing individuals; that modem methods make mass
production more efficient up to a certain p'oint, and that an orderly market
is required for the efficient distribution of goods. However, it is easy in
times of depression to broaden the principles underlying the maintenance
of orderly markets until they become an excuse for industrial empire
building. In the prosecution by the Department of Justice this danger
must be kept in mind. There are pressures peculiar to times of depression
to maintain former high prices by agreements to restrict production on
the principle of the necessity of an orderly market. We naturally can not
sanction such distortions of a beneficent principle.
A second question of policy important in the antitrust cases is the
recognition that results in restraint of trade are more important than the
intent which lies behind them. In facing the difficult problem of deter-
mining whether size has gone beyond efficiency and has resulted in dom-
ination, or in the equally difficult question of whether a particular situation
requires the application of a principle of an orderly marketing, little light
is shed by discussing the problem on moral grounds. The difficulties in
enforcing the antitrttst laws due to the search for that fictitious thing
known as corporate intent are set out in Attorney General Cummings'
report for 1937:
"Such a standard [the standard of corporate intent] is not only
vague but it does not permit consideration of the real factors in-
volved. It does not face the issue whether a combination is in fact
one which will tend to produce economies of size or whether it will
in actual operation tend to give an opportunity for monopoly profits.
The important factor is taken to be the 'intent' or 'state of mind'
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of a fictitious corporate individual. Practical results of combinations,
which are the only real criteria for effective, as distinguished from
sentimental, administration of a policy to encourage competition, are
brushed aside. We do not mean that from the multitude of conflicting
precedents this statement can be made as a matter of strict legal
definition. Nevertheless, it does accurately describe an attitude com-
monly taken by courts, emphasizing moral culpability and subordin-
ating practical effects of business activities which tend toward mon-
opoly or restraint of trade ...
"In other words, actual results are ignored in an effort to deter-
mine whether a fictitious personality is acting in an evil state of
mind. The antitrust laws have become theological tracts on cor-
porate morality."'2
These statements reflect my own present opinion. It is therefore my
belief that in the selection of cases and also in the trial and presentation
of cases we should formulate our standard in terms of the actual results
and use of legal privileges by groups in achieving domination of the mar-
ket rather than their motive. I will illustrate by the case of Interstate
Circuit v. United States, recently argued before the Supreme Court
of the United States. A first-run motion picture exhibitor, controlling
seventy-five percent of the moving pictures in Texas, had entered into
practically identical contracts with the major motion picture distributors
which prevent second-run theatres from obtaining the best pictures except
at higher admission prices than they had been accustomed to charge. Here
was a typical use of a legal privilege (the copyright) in such a way as to
restrict the outlets for moving pictures and actually to destroy competi-
tion. High admission prices were maintained and picture theatres put out
of business. The moral question in the case was whether a conspiracy
existed. To solve this it was necessary to see the shadowy line where a
conspiracy ends and good fellowship and cobperation begins. Observe
how the question proposed in another way admits a more practical answer.
Is the use of the privilege given by the copyright laws by a group which
actually dominates the market an effective suppression of competition
regardless of whether a conspiracy is proved? The fact that picture houses
have been closed and the distributing market has been narrowed by the
use of this privilege on the part of a dominating group is certainly one
of the most important factors in determining whether such a use of the
copyright is illegal. It does not give a rule of thumb but it is at least
more susceptible of critical examination than whether the group is acting
in an evil state of mind. The particular case has not been decided as this
is written.' However, these considerations were argued strenuously by the
2. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) 39.
3. The Suprerhe Court recently remanded the case to the district court for formal
findings of fact and a separate statement of conclusions of lav. Interstate Circuit, Inc.,
v. United States (1938) 5 U. S. L. WEEX 1028.
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Solicitor General and they should be argued in future cases. The Depart-
ment does not of course control the decisions of the court, but in that
area which it does control, that is, in the selection of the cases which are
to be prosecuted out of a large number of complaints, only some of which
is it even possible to investigate, actual monopoly results should be a more
important consideration than motive.
A third question of policy concerns the choice between the civil and
criminal procedures. It is my* belief that under the present laws the most
effective deterrent lies on the criminal side of the court, in so far as the
prevention of illegal practices is concerned. I am talking about the situa-
tion as it now exists. I am aware that there are difficulties in a system
which presents issues of extreme complication to jurors. I do not deny
that by amendment changes might not be wrought upon the civil pro-
cedure wliich would make me modify my present position. However, I
am not now discussing amendments, but the use of the tools which are
now at hand.
I can make clearer the advantages of the criminal procedure by using
an analogy. Violation of antitrust laws is more like the crime of reckless
driving under pressure of haste or necessity than it is like conduct indulged
in by those who are commonly called criminals. Take the familiar case
which is repeated constantly in this country of a young man with respect-
able background with every expectation of a useful and brilliant career,
who, in order to meet a social engagement, exceeds the speed laws and
kills a pedestrian. There is no way before the jury verdict is handed in
to predict whether he will be held guilty of manslaughter. His friends
may hope for acquittal and believe that his conduct lies on the side of
carelessness rather than recklessness. Nevertheless, no one would deny
that such cases should be vigorously prosecuted. No one would assert that
the prosecuting attorney should evade his responsibility to submit such
issues to a jury. No one would pretend that an injunction which prevented
the young man from doing it again would be an effective way to solve
the problem of the reckless driver who may, in spite of his respectable
background, be more dangerous to society than the burglar.
This is the kind of a crime committed by those who violate antitrust
laws, under various business pressures to expand and to get as much of
the market as possible. Such pressures can only be offset.by a deterrent
involving the risk of social stigma. It is as impossible for the Antitrust
Division to detect or prosecute all of the violations of the antitrust laws
as it is for any police force to detect and prosecute all the persons who
drive sixty miles an hour. It is therefore necessary that business men
realize that when they indulge in a doubtful practice they are taking the
chance of something more than an injunction. They must not be per-
mitted to weigh the chance of pecuniary liability against the chance of
enormous profit, and government injunctions do not even involve pe-
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cuniary liability. This does not mean that instances will not be found
where men who have recklessly or carelessly violated antitrust laws are
not entitled to individual sympathy because of their unfortunate predica-
ment. Nevertheless, the public should realize that without this kind of
a deterrent the antitrust laws are useless.
The efficacy of the criminal penalty is illustrated in many cases which
have been brought to my attention where corporate directors are willing
to spend large sums of money belonging to the corporation in order to
avoid the social stigma of a small individual fine. The ineffectiveness of
civil prosecutions is illustrated by the fact that many of them assume almost
the appearance of unemployment relief for attorneys, or distribution of
patronage by the corporation. 'During such battles attorneys live magni-
ficently. When a complicated decree is finally rendered a new scheme is
often set up designed to appear plausible under the terms of the decree.
A new suit is filed. By that time the actual persons who violated the
law have sold their stock and are quite ready to accept a consent decree.
A fourth question of policy deals with the use of the civil and criminal
proceedings concurrently, and in obtaining a consent decree in cases where
the final outcome of the criminal case is uncertain, and relief to competitors
and to the public is even more important than punishment of offenders
delayed by long trials and appeals. It is the position of the Department
that it was the intention of Congress in providing these two concurrent
penalties that they could be used. In spite of the confusion recently
created, the law on this point is, I think, clear. I know of no ethical
policy which contradicts the plain provisions of the act of Congress or
which forbids criminal prosecutions while negotiations for the consent
decree are pending. However, the test of a consent decree obtained under
such circumstances must be relief to the public which would be denied
by delay. It should not be on the basis on which private litigation is
compromised. One is concerned with the past; the other with the future.
The fifth question of policy which I wish to discuss is in some respects
most important of all. It concerns making public the decisions and atti-
tudes of the Department of Justice in the selection and prosecution of
cases. The aim of such a policy is to give business men both guides and
warnings in a field which is as admittedly uncertain in definition as the
conception of reckless driving on the highway. The reason for such a
policy is that there is no way that I know of to avoid the use of discre-
tion and judgment in the conduct of the Antitrust Division. All com-
plaints can not be prosecuted. A selection must be made. Therefore, the
grounds underlying that selection should be publicly stated in each case
to the end that a consistent and open policy of prosecution may gradually
be derived from statements in connection with individual cases.
In the past there has been no continuing practice of announcing at the
initiation of each prosecution why that particular prosecution was brought.
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The complaint itself directed at the narrow issue of the case is not a
sufficient guide, because legal strategy necessarily plays a large part in
its draftsmanship. It is a well known fact that business men have always
found difficulty in interpreting the policy of the Department of Justice.
The need for information on its policy is evidenced by the countless
memoranda which are submitted to the Department in the hope of getting
some indication of the Department's attitude. The rulings of no other
department can give that information, because it is what the Department
of Justice is going to do, and not what other departments think, which is
important to business men. There is no reason why information as to
the policies of the Department of Justice, so long as it does not involve
the granting of individual immunity, should not be available to business
men. The distribution of that information would be of advantage to both
sides. So far as the government is concerned, it would prevent the argu-
ment of acquiescence in the cases where the government has not actually
prosecuted. So far as business is concerned, it should be both a warning
and a guide, because it would localize the Department's interpretation of
the law to a particular industry. Obviously, however, it is unsafe to con-
vey that information by promises of immunity to individuals on the bases
of the data which they submit. The first step by a large organization in
a plan of monopoly control is often the first move in a chess game and
the player on the opposing side can not possibly guess the strategy behind
it. There is no way of telling whether or not the particular data submitted
is a Trojan horse.
The only safe way of building up information as to Department atti-
tudes and policy is through announcements made at the beginning of each
procedure, whether it be an investigation or an indictment, or a civil prose-
cution. Such an announcement might contain general information of how
the Department is going to apply antitrust principles to a localized situa-
tion: (1) the summary of conditions the Department believed to exist in
the particular industry which tended toward the violation of the antitrust
laws and created the necessity of an investigation; (2) the reason why
the particular procedure, whether civil or criminal, was chosen instead of
some other kind of procedure; (3) the results the Department hopes to
,obtain in the prosecution of a particular case.
Let us apply such an announcement of policy to a hypothetical case
which is designed to illustrate a number of different t3pes of problems.
-Suppose the X company has over a period of years crushed competition in
its industrial area until there is little likelihood of reviving it by the en-
forcement of an antitrust decree. Suppose that during the past twenty
years there has been such governmental acquiescence in this process that
.as a practical matter criminal prosecution would be unsuccessful. Suppose
-the attention of the Department is called to an additional expansion of
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the X company which will swallow up one of the few remaining competi-
tors and that civil suit is authorized.
To explain its policy in bringing that suit, the Department might pub-
lish a careful analysis giving first, the conditions in the industry, second,
the reason for its selection for a civil prosecution, and third, the economic
result it hopes to accomplish. In this particular hypothetical case, assume
that no far reaching economic results would be expected. It should then
be frankly stated that the reason for bringing the suit was to put the X
company on notice that no further acquisitions would be tolerated. This
would at least lay the foundation for a criminal prosecution for a repeti-
tion of such conduct in the future. The report might then go on to state
that structure of the X company is in itself a violation of the antitrust
laws, but that in view of the improbability of recreating within a reason-
able period of time by antitrust prosecution the competition which has
been destroyed, the Department was using its personnel to push cases
under which greater economic results would be expected. This would not
be a waiver of the antitrust laws or agreement of immunity. It would
only be a reason for the present determination to prosecute, given in public
and subject to criticism and to revision by Congress. In the particular
hypothetical case, the report might contain data from which Congress
could further investigate the conditions and devise more effective tech-
niques than those now available for meeting such situations. If the De-
partment was wrong in its conclusion, it could be brought before the bar
of congressional judgment.
After such a report, any business man connected with the industry
could make an informed judgment about the interpretation of the Anti-
trust Laws by the Department in that particular area.
If each important suit were prefaced by such a statement of policy
there would be built up gradually within the Department a reasonably
consistent polity which would be a matter of public record. More con-
sistency in the changing personnel of the Department might be expected
to follow because it is a habit of human institutions to follow a pattern
which they have publicly accepted. If changes were made, cogent reasons
would have to be developed. If the policy was wrong it could be cor-
rected.
This seems to me to be the only solution to the problem of bringing
the present concealed process of the necessary selection of cases out into
the open where it can be a guide and a warning. General provisions and
formulae can never eliminate the use of discretion and judgment because
the fundamental distinctions between efficient size and monopoly control
and between the maintenance of orderly market and industrial empire
building are too vague. They can become concrete only where they are
localized and applied to conditions of a particular industry. No rule which
has to apply to completely unlike conditions under dissimilar situations
[Vol. 47: 12941302
HeinOnline  -- 47 Yale L. J. 1302 1937-1938
1938] USE OF PRESENT ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 1303
can ever be more than the statement of an ideal. We already have com-
plete public acceptance of the ideal. 'What we lack is a series of public
applications of that ideal to particular industries which will give it more
definite application.
I conceive of the duty of the Department of Justice both to the courts
and to Congress. To the courts they owe the duty of fair and able pre-
sentation of the particular cases which they prosecute. To Congress they
owe the duty of marking out an intelligible line of policy of law enforce-
ment. No other department can possibly outline that duty for them in
a field where rules of thumb are not possible. Therefore, acting under
the advice of the Attorney General, I propose to announce in connection
with the particular cases or investigations which are instituted in the
future enough information so that the exercise of the discretion in select-
ing the cases may be as consistent as public announcement and public
criticism can make it.
As I said at the outset, I do not wish to confuse the discussion of fair
and efficient enforcement of present Antitrust Laws with the problem of
amendment, which is a separate problem. An analysis of what can be
done with present procedure, however, throws incidental light upon the
type of amendment which is most desirable. There are unquestionably
better ways of investigation than by a grand jury. There are also means
of implementing the civil process so that the criminal procedure wvill not
be the only effective deterrent. An analysis of present procedure also indi-
cates that the power of public investigation on the part of the Department
might clarify the task of making its policy public and intelligible. These
questions I leave for discussion at a later time. One aid to intelligent
amendment can be accomplished by public statements in connection with
individual cases. They can serve to call the attention of Congress to par-
ticular uses of legal privileges such as patents, copyrights, credit, cor-
porate forms of organization, etc., which are being used in particular
industries. Remedial legislation arrived at in that way would be definitely
directed at particular problems. Such legislation is apt to be more concrete
and more adapted to its ends than legislation which relies on general
formulae. Our ideal is already well stated in the Sherman Law. It only
requires particular application.
On examination by the Senate Committee I stated that I believed that
antitrust enforcement should be both vigorous and fair. This paper has
been an attempt to give content to those words. By a continuing policy
of public statement when individual cases are commenced, I hope to make
them even more concrete by giving them a particular application to the
various dissimilar situations to which we must apply the general policies
of the Antitrust Laws. The Antitrust Act represents a public policy to
keep open and free the channels of opportunity, which has never been more
important than today.
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